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bstract
Extreme cherry pickers are customers who seek price deals and excessively avail themselves of deep discount offers, which generates negative
rofits for retailers. This study uses market transaction and primary consumer survey data to provide insights into the determinants, prevalence,
nd profit impacts of such behavior in the frequently purchased goods market. We find that the extreme cherry picking segment is small (about 2%
f all shoppers), but its relative value varies across stores, and consumers manifest this behavior only in secondary stores. An inverse U-shaped
elationship marks consumers’ opportunity costs for cross-store price search and likelihood of extreme cherry picking behavior. Finally, we also
nd that a loss leader promotional strategy adds to retailers’ bottom lines, despite the pure loss generated by extreme cherry pickers.
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Retailers use price promotions as both an offensive mecha-
ism to attract competitors’ customers and a defensive strategy
o retain current customers (Gupta 1988; Inman and McAlister
993; Raghubir, Inman, and Grande 2004). U.S. retailers across
ll product categories in 2004 spent about $429 billion in such
romotions; a more recent estimate by ACNielsen (2007) sug-
ests that promotional sales account for as much as 36% of total
rocery sales.
A prevalent price promotion strategy uses “loss leaders” or
roducts temporarily discounted heavily to a selling price at or
elow the retailers’ cost as a way to offer additional incentives to
eal-prone, store-switching consumers. These loss leaders gen-
rally appear in the largest ads in a retailer’s promotions and in
he biggest display space, to facilitate their rapid sales. Duncan,
ollander, and Savitt (1983) argue that the economies of scale
ssociated with shopping encourage consumers to buy goods
ther than loss leaders once they are in the store. Therefore,
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tores offer loss leaders to attract consumers, then price their
ther products to compensate for the deals offered on the loss
eaders, with the expectation that loss leaders not only increase
tore traffic but also lead to net incremental profits from the sales
f other products to shoppers who visit to buy loss leaders.
As retailers intensify their price promotions, consumers have
he opportunity to obtain frequently purchased goods at lower
rices merely by shifting their purchase timing or quantities
o a given store or by engaging in cross-store shopping. Past
esearch suggests that consumers respond to price promotions by
ngaging in price search and by trading off the benefits of price
earch against the opportunity costs of time for undertaking the
earch (Putrevu and Ratchford 1997; Ratchford 1982; Urbany,
ickson, and Kalapurakal 1996). Many consumers spend con-
iderable time and effort bargain hunting and enjoy the thrill
f getting bargains, in addition to the price savings (Karolefski
002; Lin-Fisher 2007; Marmorstein, Grewal, and Fiske 1992;
edeschi 2003). They efficiently and systematically track down
nformation about relevant price deals and even form local or
nternet-based interest groups to share this information (Lin-
isher 2007).In the context of the loss leader promotions, retailers also
ace the threat of “devils” or “extreme cherry pickers” (Gauri,
udhir, and Talukdar 2008; McAlister, George, and Chien 2009).
hese consumers visit specific retailers exclusively to buy loss
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eaders or items with deep discounts and, as a consequence,
enerate negative profit contributions for the retailer. Retail man-
gers remain apprehensive about the size of this segment of
onsumers. According to Brad Andersen, CEO of Best Buy,
pproximately 20% of its 500 million annual customer visits
eature “devils” who “buy the products, apply for rebates, return
he purchases, and then buy them back at returned merchandise
iscounts . . . load up on ‘loss leaders’ and flip the goods at profit
n eBay” (McWilliams 2004, p. A1; see also Elberse, Gourville,
nd Narayandas 2005).
Existing academic literature provides little insight into such
xtreme loss-inducing customer behavior, at either the individ-
al customer or the aggregate store level. Additionally, recent
eviews of the retailing literature have called for research to
xamine cherry picking behavior across stores (Grewal and Levy
007, 2009). Therefore, we focus on extreme cherry pickers as
customer segment in the frequently purchased goods (FPG)
rocery market, which accounts for approximately half a tril-
ion dollars in the United States and takes up a significant part
f household consumption expenditures (U.S. Census Bureau
006). This market is also characterized by widespread loss
eader pricing to entice customers (Drèze 1995). Marketers and
etailers need to be cognizant of the financial implications of
heir marketing strategies (Kumar 2008; Petersen et al. 2009;
hankar 2008). Grocery retailers need to know the extent of
ystematic extreme cherry picking (ECP) behavior among their
ustomers, who these customers are, and how their behavior
dversely affects store profits. Using both survey and market
ata to match the stated attitudes and revealed behaviors of con-
umers, we provide comprehensive empirical insights into the
cope and profit impact of ECP behavior. Specifically, we: (1)
stimate the size of the ECP segment across different stores
n different competitive market contexts, (2) identify the key
arket and individual consumer characteristics that drive ECP
ehavior, and (3) estimate the incremental net impact of loss
eader pricing on a retailer’s profit in the presence of ECP behav-
or by its customers.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: In the next
ection, we summarize the existing research, followed by discus-
ions of the conceptual framework we use to guide our empirical
nalyses and the data for the analyses. Next, we present the
esults from our analyses. We conclude with some implications
nd future research directions.
Relevant existing research
A well-established stream of empirical research investigates
onsumers’ responses to price promotions by considering their
eal proneness (Bawa and Shoemaker 1987; Blattberg et al.
978) or their promotion proneness (Lichtenstein, Netemeyer,
nd Burton 1990). This definition conceptualizes deal proneness
s consumers’ psychological propensity to buy goods on promo-
ion, not their actual purchase. That is, deal-prone consumers
espond to price-based benefits because they appear in the form
f a deal, rather than because they offer lower prices (i.e., buying
n deal has psychological benefits, irrespective of the finan-
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his conceptualization also is consistent with observations of the
thrill” or “transaction value” consumers often get from finding
rice deals (Grewal, Monroe, and Krishnan 1998).
Previous research on deal proneness tends to investigate the
xtent of deal-seeking behavior and the correlates or drivers of
hat behavior. Such research falls into two distinct streams based
n the type of data used: consumer survey data regarding con-
umers’ stated price search propensity or deal-seeking behavior
e.g., Beatty and Smith 1987; Putrevu and Ratchford 1997;
rbany, Dickson, and Kalapurakal 1996; Urbany, Dickson, and
awyer 2000) and field or scanner data pertaining to consumers’
bserved purchase and deal-seeking behavior (e.g., Carlson
nd Gieseke 1983; Fox and Hoch 2005; Gauri, Sudhir, and
alukdar 2008; Mace and Neslin 2004; Neslin, Henderson, and
uelch 1985; Shankar and Bolton 2004). Observed behaviors
nclude the percentage of deal purchases, stockpiling, purchase
ccelerations or delays, store and brand switching, and vis-
ts to multiple competing stores during the same shopping
rip.
Estimates of the size of the deal-prone segment in the
PG market range from 3% to 50% (Blattberg et al. 1978;
ichtenstein, Burton, and Netemeyer 1997; Vanhuele and Drèze
002). Urbany, Dickson, and Sawyer (2000) find that approx-
mately 19% of consumers regularly shop for price specials
t multiple stores, which imply that retail managers generally
verestimate the proportion of such consumers when they claim
ne-third of customers do so. Fox and Hoch (2005) similarly find
hat consumers who visit multiple stores in the same shopping
rip constitute approximately 18% of all consumers. Existing
esearch also identifies several consumer demographic (e.g.,
ncome), psychographic (e.g., opinion leadership), and market
haracteristics (e.g., distance between competing stores) char-
cteristics that influence deal-seeking behavior (Putrevu and
atchford 1997; Urbany, Dickson, and Kalapurakal 1996).
Unfortunately, prior research has been unable to provide
nsights into the impact of consumers’ deal-seeking behav-
or on retailers’ profit (Ailawadi and Harlam 2004; Fox and
och 2005). Despite the significant managerial interest in this
mpact (McAlister, George, and Chien 2009), existing literature
acks studies that investigate the link between consumers’ deal-
eeking behavior and their profit contributions to retailers. Using
ndividual level data from two stores in the home improvement
roduct market, Mulhern and Padgett (1995) find that regular
rice purchases are highly correlated with promotional price pur-
hases. They find that among shoppers who identify promotions
s one of the reasons for visiting the stores, about three quarter
f them make regular purchases also. This provides support for
he underlying rationale for loss leader promotions—that ‘deep
iscount’ items may enhance the sale of other items at indi-
idual consumer level. Ailawadi et al. (2006), using drugstore
ata, find that more than half of the individual promotions are
ot profitable, but they induce a significant positive halo effect.
owever, they do not explicitly analyze the profit impact of losseader promotions or consumers’ ECP behavior.
We investigate the prevalence of ECP behavior in the FPG
arket by analyzing a data set of customer-level transaction data
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cross 152 stores. Furthermore, we provide the first systematic
nalysis – in both conceptual and empirical terms – of the key
arket and consumer characteristics that drive ECP behavior.
ur novel data set, which combines actual purchase data with
urvey data from households, enables us to develop a detailed
omparative profile of extreme cherry pickers based on both
bservable and attitudinal measures.
Because extreme cherry pickers represent an unavoidable
ost of a deep discount or loss leader pricing strategy for retail-
rs, if the proportion of these consumers is larger, the loss
eader pricing strategy may be unprofitable or ineffective (Drèze
995). The limited existing studies on the impact of loss leader
ricing strategy on store performance or profit (Walters and
acKenzie 1988; Walters and Rinne 1986) use aggregate store-
evel data. In contrast, we employ individual customer-level
ata to test the profitability of loss leader pricing strategy in
he presence of ECP behavior and to decompose and estimate
he unavoidable cost of its negative profit contribution compared
ith the incremental positive profit contribution of loss leader
ricing.
Conceptual framework
ntecedents/characteristics of extreme cherry picking
ehaviorConceptual framework for our study is represented in
ig. 1. We start with some fundamental, logical inferences
hat are consistent with the grocery retail market dynamics and
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nd coverage of items across categories that are subject to loss
eader price promotions means customers find only a fraction
f items on promotion. That is, they likely cannot patronize
single store for any substantial share of their overall mar-
et basket and still generate a net negative profit contribution
or that store. For customers to generate a net negative profit
ontribution they likely visit the store only occasionally to
pecifically take advantage of loss leader promotions for their
tems of interest; otherwise, they purchase at another store.
hat is, the negative profit impact appears only with respect
o a secondary store. We focus on understanding the factors
hat should lead to such outcomes for any cross-store shopping
ehavior.
Two theories from the economics literature are especially
elevant and form the conceptual basis of our study. One is the
ecker’s (1965) theoretical framework of household production,
hich has been used as a guiding force for understanding the role
f various consumer and market characteristics on consumers’
aluation of times and how such valuations affects various facets
f consumer behavior (Horsky 1990). The other is the Stigler’s
1961) economics of information theory that serves as a semi-
al foundation to understanding consumers’ information search
ehavior including price search (Ratchford 1982). These two
heories essentially complement each other.
A fundamental premise underlying both the aforesaid theo-
ies (Becker 1965; Stigler 1961) is that consumers perceive their
ime as especially valuable, and they use an implicit cost–benefit
ramework to make trade-offs between the opportunity cost of
ime for engaging in a specific activity and the expected ben-
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ur study, this cost–benefit conceptual framework posits that
ustomers would choose a cross-store search strategy that maxi-
izes their potential savings, net their costs (e.g., Marmorstein,
rewal, and Fiske 1992; Putrevu and Ratchford 1997). We now
iscuss how Becker’s (1965) theoretical framework of house-
old production can be used to analytically characterize this
ost–benefit framework behind a consumer’s cross-store search
trategy.
For any given customer, we consider two grocery stores, the
rimary store and the main secondary store. The use of only the
wo most frequently visited grocery stores reflects both supply-
nd demand-side considerations. On the supply side, the regional
arket we analyze represents a de facto duopoly grocery market
tructure, with two regional supermarket chains accounting for
ore than 80% of market shares (see Lal and Matutes 1994;
al and Villas-Boas 1998; Rao and Syam 2001). On the demand
ide, several recent studies (e.g., Gauri, Sudhir, and Talukdar
008) note that a household’s grocery spending typically con-
entrates in just one or two stores.3 In this context, according to
rogressive Grocer (2005), an average consumer shops in 2.17
upermarkets and the percentage share of spending done in the
rimary supermarket is 73%. Further, it is important to recog-
ize that the focus of our study is on systematic ECP behavior
f a customer with respect to a store.4 Thus, it is especially rea-
onable in our study to abstract way from the marginal stores in
household’s grocery store choice set.
As per Becker’s (1965) theoretical framework of household
roduction, a consumer must decide which market goods to pur-
hase and how to allocate her time so that she “produces” the
tility maximizing mixture of “commodities” to satisfy her reg-
lar household needs. On any given decision cycle time, the
onsumer maximizes a utility function which has as arguments
different commodities, Zi, (e.g., household grocery shopping;
ousehold entertainments) that satisfy her regular household
eeds. Following Horsky (1990) and using similar notations,
he consumer decision process in our current study context can
hen be specified as:
ax U = F (Z1, Z2, ......, Zm) such that : (1)
i = fi(xi0, xi2, . . . , xin1 ; ti1(1 + h0xi0), ti2, . . . , tin2 ; D),





pjxij = I = wtw + V (1b)
3 As we discuss later, our own data show that a household’s grocery store
hoice set size is essentially two with an almost exclusive concentration of its
rocery spending (90%-100%) at the top two visited stores in its choice set with
he other stores being very marginal in terms of spending share.
4 To capture such systematic ECP behavior of a customer with respect to a
tore in the FPG market context of our empirical analysis, we only look at those
ustomers who has visited the store at least on 12 occasions over the year and















til + tw = T (1c)
i0 = 0, 1 (1d)
Constraint (1a) above shows the household production func-
ions that reflect how the various commodities are produced
y a combination of market goods, the consumer’s time and
ther inputs. The amount of market good j which is used
n the production of commodity i is xij, and the amount of
ime spent on activity l for the production of commodity i is
il. In the production function of commodities, D represents
vector of characteristics such as household size. Thus, for
xample, a larger household may require more market goods
nd time inputs for producing a specific commodity. In gen-
ral, there can be n1i different frequently purchased market
oods and n2i different time intensive activities which go into
he production of commodity i. For example, if commodity
is household grocery shopping, then its production requires
arious grocery items needed by the household, shopping trip
imes, etc. In order to achieve price savings, the consumer may
onsider a cross-store trip (between her primary and main sec-
ndary stores) as part of her shopping trip. If she decides not
o make a cross-store trip, then xio = 0. On the other hand,
f she decides to make a cross-store trip, then xio = 1 and it
ncreases her total shopping trip time, ti1, by a fraction h0.
t the same, let gio be the typical price savings gain she can
ave from a cross-store trip that splits her shopping basket
etween her primary and main secondary stores. The law of
riangles (i.e., sum of two sides is always greater than the
hird side) reveals that it will always be cheaper for this con-
umer to undertake a common shopping trip rather than separate
rips.
The choices the consumer makes concerning market goods
nd time allocation are constrained by both her income and time.
or instance, the total expenditure on market goods is limited by
ach period’s money income, I, which is the sum of her earned
ages, wtw, and other income, V (see constraint (1b)); w is the
ages rate of the consumer and tw is the time spent working.
he unit price of the frequently purchased market good j is pj.
onstraint (1c) divides the total time available, T, for the given
ecision time cycle into working time and time devoted to the
roduction of various commodities, including rest and sleep.
he income and time constraints can be combined into a single
onstraint by substitution of the working time, tw, from (1c) into
1b) to yield:










til = wT+V = S
(2)
he new combined constraint indicates that the “full” income,
, which would be realized if all time were devoted to work,
nd is spent partly on goods and partly by foregoing earn-
ngs to use time in household production. The consumer’s
ecision problem (1) on how to allocate her income and time
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hen be solved through the following Lagrangian (Horsky
990):
ax L = F [f1(x11, ...), ....., fi(xi0, xi1, ...., ti1(1 + h0xi0), ti2, .










s shown by Horsky (1990) in the analogous consumer deci-
ion context of whether to adopt a time saving new product,
onditions under which a consumer decided whether to engage
n cross-store search strategy can be drawn from the above
nalytical optimization framework. Specifically, assuming that
ross-store trip is not made (i.e., xi0 = 0), the Lagrangian defined
n (3) can be solved to determine the total amount of time, t∗i1,
hat the consumer should spend on shopping trip. The consumer
s then indifferent between either engaging or not engaging in
ross-store search when the additional time, h0t∗i1, spent on
ross-store search reaches a level at which h0wt∗i1 = gi0. The
ndifferent consumer thus faces an “opportunity cost” (Stigler
961) C = h0wt∗i1 for undertaking cross-store search on a shop-
ing trip that is equal to the typical price savings gain, gi0, from
uch cross-store search. The additional time, h0t∗i1, spent on
ross-store search by a consumer will consist of A + d/s, where A
s the additional time (e.g., separate checkout, parking) required
o shop at another store (Fox and Hoch 2005), d is the distance
raveled to perform the cross-store search, and s is the speed of
he typical mode of transport. Thus, taken together, the opportu-
ity cost faced by a consumer for undertaking cross-store search







he above cost–benefit framework of consumers’ shopping trip
mplies three consumer segments that correspond to three dis-
inct cases for the magnitude of the opportunity cost (C) of
ross-store search relative to the typical savings (gi0) from such
earch:
Segment 1 (Seekers: Occasional basket splitters): For seekers,
he opportunity cost of a cross-store search is approximately
he same as the typical savings gi0 of their search. Therefore,
hey buy almost exclusively from the primary store, though they
ay occasionally split their shopping baskets when loss leader
romotions in the secondary store provide more savings. In other
ords, these customers do not find it cost effective to engage in
egular cross-store search, except in response to deep discounts
y the secondary store on the items of interest. Thus, they reveal a
isproportionate concentration of deeply discounted loss leader
tem purchases from secondary stores. These customers generate
egative profit margins at their secondary stores but positive
rofit margins at their primary store.
Segment 2 (Opportunists: Regular basket splitters): Oppor-
unists experience low opportunity costs of cross-store search
etween primary and secondary stores and enjoy savings S that
re much greater than their opportunity costs. These customers
egularly split their shopping baskets to take advantage of market





iling 86 (4, 2010) 336–354
...., fm(xm1, ....)]
} (3)
oncentration of loss leader item purchases at either store, so
hey generate low but positive profit margins for both stores.
Segment 3 (Loyalists: Rare basket splitters): In direct con-
rast, with opportunists, loyalists have high opportunity costs
or cross-store search and experience much lower gi0 than their
pportunity cost of cross-store search. This trade-off implies that
hese customers are one-store loyal shoppers with little incen-
ive to seek price deals. They likely buy almost exclusively from
heir primary store with rare, if any, shopping trips to secondary
tores, which mostly represent fill-in rather than deal-seeking
rips. These customers will generate high, positive profit margins
or both primary and secondary stores.
This discussion of price search underscores two important
oints. First, the framework decomposes the deal-prone seg-
ent, typically identified as a single segment in the existing
iterature (e.g., Blattberg et al. 1978; Urbany, Dickson, and
alapurakal 1996), into two distinct segments. Thus, we can
ecognize explicitly and investigate the two materially distinct
mpacts of deal-seeking behavior on the key operational vari-
ble of interest to retailers, namely, customer profit contribution.
econd, somewhat counter intuitively, it suggests customers
ho are most likely to generate negative profit contributions
re not those with the lowest opportunity cost for cross-store
hopping. Rather, we consider an inverse U-shaped relation-
hip between customers’ opportunity cost and likelihood of
xhibiting ECP behavior (see Fig. 2). At the aggregate mar-
et level, this inverse U-shaped relationship should be evident
etween the mean opportunity cost of cross-store search (nearest
ompeting store) for customers of a store and the propor-
ions of customers exhibiting ECP behavior. As one of its key
oals, our study empirically tests for this inverse U-shaped rela-
ionship at both the individual customer and aggregate store
evels.
Furthermore, we hope to gain systematic empirical insights
nto the comparative consumer characteristics of those who
xhibit ECP behavior and the effects of market (e.g., competi-
ion) and retail (e.g., store size) characteristics. We offer a priori
onceptual expectations about these insights on the basis of our
ost–benefit framework, as well as relevant prior research.
omparative consumer characteristics
Consumer characteristics can be classified as stated and
evealed. Stated characteristics include self-reported attitudinal
nd behavioral measures, as well as socio-economic demograph-
cs. Revealed characteristics pertain to observed purchases that
apture consumers’ actual shopping behavior and related mea-
ures. To gain insights into both types, we consider the three
ustomer segments identified by our conceptual cost–benefit
ramework; specifically, we compare the expected levels of
elected consumer characteristics among ECP customers (Seg-
ent 1: Seekers) with those for low, positive profit margin






















































Fig. 2. Conceptual relationship between cross-store sea
ustomers (Segment 2: Opportunists) and high, positive profit
argin customers (Segment 3: Loyalists).
As we noted in our conceptual framework, a key compar-
tive difference across the segments is their total opportunity
ost of cross-store price search. Eq. (1) also implies that
he unit opportunity cost of time and cross-store distance
ill be lower for seekers and opportunists than for loyal-
sts. Furthermore, regarding differences in relevant behavioral
utcomes, only seekers and opportunists should exhibit price
eal-seeking behavior, though we expect a substantive dif-
erence in the nature of such behavior. That is, opportunists
isit both stores regularly to seek all types of price deals,
hereas seekers visit their secondary store only occasionally
o take advantage of specific, deep discount, or loss leader price
eals.
We expect trip frequency to the primary store to be higher for
eekers and opportunists than for loyalists and trip frequency
o the secondary store to be lower for seekers and loyalists
han for opportunists. Moreover, wallet share should concen-
rate at the primary store for seekers and loyalists, more so than
or opportunists, which splits its share of wallet more evenly.
egarding attitudinal characteristics, we use various measures
dentified in prior research that offers evidence of a positive cor-
elation between deal-seeking behavior and measures of cross-
nd within-store search propensities, market mavenism, and per-
eived search skills (Dickson and Sawyer 1990; Feick and Price
987; Gauri, Sudhir, and Talukdar 2008; Putrevu and Ratchford
997; Urbany, Dickson, and Kalapurakal 1996). Therefore,
ttitudinal measures should be higher for seekers and oppor-





ost and likelihood of extreme cherry picking behavior.
n cross-store search behavioral outcomes, we also expect that
he measure of cross-store search propensity will be lower for
eekers than for opportunists.
Existing evidence about the impact of individual demo-
raphic characteristics on deal proneness and price search
ehavior appears mixed. Some studies indicate a weak or nonex-
stent relationship (Magi and Julander 2005; Montgomery 1971;
ossi and Allenby 1993); others find mild to strong associa-
ions between demographic characteristics and price or coupon
esponses (Bawa and Shoemaker 1987; Blattberg et al. 1978;
arlson and Gieseke 1983; Inman, Shankar, and Ferraro 2004;
arasimhan 1984; Urbany, Dickson, and Kalapurakal 1996).
e thus consider the differences across segments in terms of
ge or household size empirically open questions. However,
ecause household income acts as a proxy for unit opportu-
ity cost of time, we expect it to be lower for seekers and
pportunists.
We summarize our a priori conceptual expectations for the
elected consumer characteristics in Table 1. The relationship
f consumer characteristics across the three segments (and thus
ith customer profitability) is not strictly monotonic or linear,
s suggested by existing literature. Furthermore, by using the
onceptual framework to decompose deal-prone consumers into
wo segments, we recognize the materially distinct impacts of
eal-seeking behavior on customers’ profit contributions and
est empirically the unexplored non-monotonic relationships
etween several key consumer characteristics and customer
rofitability. Appendix C presents a complete list of the items
or various attitudinal measures, their corresponding reliability
oefficients, and sources.
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Table 1
Expected comparative profiles of extreme cherry pickers by selected consumer characteristics.













Stated characteristics Blattberg et al. (1978) b (6c, 8)
1. Opportunity cost of cross-store search Moderate Low High Carlson and Gieseke (1983) d (6, 7, 8)
2. Cross-store search propensity Moderate High Low Dickson and Sawyer (1990) d (2, 3, 5)
3. Within-store search propensity High High Low Feick and Price (1987) d (4)
4. Market mavenism/enjoyment High High Low Gauri, Sudhir, and Talukdar
(2008) e
(1–8)
5. Perceived price search skill High High Low Magi and Julander (2005) d (7, 8)
6. Age Not clear Not clear Not clear Marmorstein, Grewal, and
Fiske (1992) d
(1, 5)
7. Household size Not clear Not clear Not clear Putrevu and Ratchford (1997) d (1, 4, 5)





1. Cross-store distance Low Low High Fox and Hoch (2005)e (1–5)
2. Trip frequency at the primary store High High Low Gauri, Sudhir, and Talukdar
(2008) e
3. Trip frequency at the secondary store Low High Low
4. Wallet share at the primary store High Moderate High
5. Wallet share at the secondary store Low Moderate Low
a Each number in the “variables included” column indicates the inclusion of the corresponding numbered variable in that study.
b This study uses the presence of children in the house under 6 years of age as an indicator for less time available for shopping.


















d The focus domain of this study is only on consumers’ price search behavior
e The focus domain of this study is on both consumers’ price search behavior
f This study uses the number of children in the house less than 5 years of age
ole of market and retailer characteristics
Various market- and retailer-level characteristics may influ-
nce deal-seeking behavior (see Table 2). For example, compe-
ition has a significant impact on search behavior (Ratchford and
rinivasan 1993) and a store’s net profits (Ailawadi et al. 2006);
e similarly expect that as the number of competitors within






xpected role of selected market and retailer characteristics on extreme cherry pickin
haracteristics Expected role
arket characteristics
1. Number of competing stores +
2. Per capita income of households –
3. Mean household size +
4. Mean age +
5. Married rate Not clear
6. Home ownership rate Not clear
etailer characteristics
1. Mean depth of price promotion +
2. Mean number of loss leader items on sale +
3. Size of store +
a Each number in the “variables included” column indicates the inclusion of the co
b This study depicts competition as population divided by the number of stores.
c The focus domain of this study is only on consumer promotion.
d The focus domain of this study is on identifying characteristics of deal prone hou
e The focus domain of this study is only on consumers’ price search behavior.onsumer promotion.
indicator for less time available for shopping.
ickers will increase, because they have more stores from which
o choose. Hoch et al. (1995) reveal a significant impact on price
ensitivity of the income, size, and age of households in a trading
rea, and Ailawadi et al. (2006) report positive effects of income
nd proportion of single-family homes on net profits. However,
hey find a negative impact on profits of the proportion of house-
olds with more than three people. Blattberg et al. (1978) reveal
g behavior of consumers.
Related prior research Variables includeda
(1b, 2, 3, 6)
Ailawadi et al. (2006) c (6)
Blattberg et al. (1978) d (1, 4)
Boatwright, Dhar, and Rossi (2004) c (2, 3, 4)
Hoch et al. (1995) c (2, 3, 4)
Mace and Neslin (2004) c (1)
Ratchford and Srinivasan (1993) e
(1, 3)
Ailawadi et al. (2006) c (1)
McAlister, George, and Chien (2009) c (2)
Walters and MacKenzie (1988) c (2)
Walters and Rinne (1986) c
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positive impact of home ownership on deal proneness; Mace
nd Neslin (2004) suggest significant impacts of household size
nd age on promotion elasticities but not of income.
Increased discount depth by a retailer may attract deal-
eeking customers who boost store sales (Ailawadi et al. 2006;
cAlister, George, and Chien 2009; Shankar and Bolton 2004);
e posit that increased depth of loss leader promotions should
e positively associated with an increased proportion of ECP
hoppers. Walters and Rinne (1986) also find that certain prod-
cts promoted as loss leaders have a greater impact on store
raffic, store sales, and deal sales, yet no portfolios of loss lead-
rs have significant impacts on retailer profits. In another study,
alters and MacKenzie (1988) find that two (of eight) categories
nfluence store profits—one positively and one negatively. We
xpect that when more loss leaders are on sale, ECP should
ncrease. Also, we expect that the proportion of ECP shoppers
ill increase with the size of the store.
revalence of extreme cherry picking behavior
To identify the prevalence of ECP behavior among its cus-
omers, a retailer must analyze the proportion of customers
ho generate negative profit contributions. An important con-
ideration entails the time window over which to evaluate the
rofit contribution. At a minimum, the window should take into
ccount the typical industry price cycle period and consumers’
hopping frequency; in the grocery retail market, both these
eriods are weekly.
We analyze customer-level transaction data for a given store
o identify the proportion of customers who generate negative
rofit contributions in any given week and over the course of an
ntire year. The weekly measure may include some customers
ho exhibit ECP behavior, even if they do not price shop system-
tically. The annual measure likely includes only customers who
xhibit ECP behavior on a sustained basis. In other words, while
he weekly measure indicates the extent of temporal or short-
erm incidence of ECP behavior, the annual measure reveals the
xtent of long-term or systematic ECP behavior among a store’s
ustomers.
tore profit impacts from extreme cherry picking behavior
Taking advantage of the availability of store-specific detailed
ransaction and profit contribution data in our data set, we
ropose a disaggregate customer-level analysis approach to
nvestigate the underlying cost–benefit trade-off implicit in the
ationale for loss leader pricing. For each store-week case, we
se transactional and profit data to analyze all customers who
ake purchases. In analytical terms, we decompose the profit
ontribution pijt of any customer i at store j on week t as:
ijt = lijt + gijt, (5)
here lijt is the negative profit contribution (or loss) generated
rom the purchase of loss leader item(s), and gijt is the posi-
ive profit contribution (gain) generated from the purchase of
on–loss leader item(s). On the basis of the composition of their miling 86 (4, 2010) 336–354 343
hopping baskets, we segment customers into three mutually
xclusive and exhaustive subsets: S(1), S(2) and S(3). In Appendix
, we provide the expression for computing the profit contribu-
ion (P (i)jt , i = 1, 2, 3) of each of the subsets.
To justify the cost–benefit rationale for loss leader pricing,
he profit contribution P (3)jt from S
(3) must more than offset the
navoidable pure loss P (2)jt imposed by S
(2). Moreover, P (3)jt rep-
esents the upper profit boundary, with the assumption that the
oss leader pricing strategy is solely responsible for inducing
ustomers in S(3) to make the shopping trip (and thus generate
he positive profit contribution P (3)jt ). This premise may not hold
or all customers in the subset.
To estimate the incremental profit gain P∗(3)jt for store j from








ijt ), ∀i ∈ S(3)jt , (6)
here aijt is an adjustment factor that captures the incremental
mpact of store j’s loss leader pricing strategy on customer i’s
ikelihood of undertaking a shopping trip to store j in week t. For
he loss leader pricing strategy to be effective, the incremental
rofit gain P∗(3)jt must be greater than the unavoidable pure loss
(2)
jt . One way to conceptualize and measure the value of the
djustment factor uses:
ijt = 1 − Prijt, (7)
here Prijt is the probability that customer i would make the
hopping trip to store j in week t even in the absence of the loss
eader promotion. The value of this adjustment factor aijt, by
efinition, should equal 0 and 1 for households in subsets S(1)
nd S(2), respectively.
We also propose two alternative approaches to estimate the
djustment factor. A heuristic approach computes the proba-
ility Prijt as the ratio of the number of non–loss leader items
o all items in the shopping basket of customer i during the
rip to store j in week t. This measure captures the concep-
ually consistent expectation that the presence of a relatively
arger proportion of loss leader items in the shopping basket
ndicates that the loss leader pricing strategy plays a significant
ncremental role in triggering that shopping trip. This approach
epresents a simple yet intuitive use of information embedded in
eadily available scanner data and thus gives retail managers an
nitial but relevant insight into the underlying profit dynamics
ehind weekly loss leader pricing. Such strategic information
s consistent with the notion of creating a marketing dashboard
or managers (Marketing Science Institute 2006). A more the-
retical method uses a statistical approach based on shopping
rip incidence or purchase timing probability is described in
ppendix B.Data
For this research, we obtain data from a major grocery super-
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tock keeping unit (SKU)-level scanner database includes all
roduct items that the chain sells in its stores. The data include
2 weeks (2002) and 152 stores of the chain across distinct
eographic markets. During this time period, we observe all
ustomer-level transactions made in each of the stores, including
nformation about the time and date of the transactions, loyalty
ard holder information, dollar volume, quantity, unit price, unit
rofit contributions, and price deals offered for each SKU sold.
The stores of the participating chain use a Hi-Lo pricing strat-
gy, enjoy a loyalty card usage rate of approximately 95%, and
ake store price promotion deals (loss leader or not) available
nly to store loyalty card holders. Thus, households likely can-
ot engage in ECP behavior without holding a loyalty card and
sing that card for transactions. Rather, we argue that an ECP
ousehold would be especially likely to own and use the loy-
lty card, because of its deal proneness. Therefore, a household
ngaged in an ECP price search strategy at the participating store
ill appear identified as such in our data.
The item cost data from the participating retail chain is the
verage marginal cost or average acquisition cost (AAC), based
n the chain’s inventory costing system for wholesale prices and
arious trade deals (Besanko, Dube, and Gupta 2005; Chevalier,
ashyap, and Rossi 2003; Gauri, Sudhir, and Talukdar 2008).
hese data also cover 100% of the universal product codes in the
tores during the 52 weeks. Therefore, we can compute the gross
rofit margin of each item on weekly basis and the gross profit
ontributions from store customers. We consider an item subject
o a loss leader promotion when its gross margin is negative and
old at a loss according to its AAC (Gauri, Sudhir, and Talukdar
008). Similarly, we define a customer as an extreme cherry
icker for the store if he or she generates a negative gross profit
ontribution from purchases in that store on a sustained basis (52
eeks); that is, according to the AAC of the items purchased
y that customer, the retailer suffers a loss. The retailer also
rovided upstream accounting cost data, which it uses to identify
oss leader items for operational decisions.
We complement the scanner data with various relevant sec-
ndary data, including information about the nearest competitor,
umber of competitors in the trading region, and floor area for
ach store. We geo-code the address (longitude, latitude) of each
tore and spatially linked it to the census block group (CBG)
olygon to which the store belongs. For each store, we use this
eo-coding to compute the distance from the nearest competing
rocery store. Using sociodemographic data at the CBG level
rom the U.S. Census Bureau, we compute distance-weighted
verages of sociodemographic variables (e.g., household size,
ncome) associated with each CBG in the trading area. Because
ar ownership rates are available only at the five-digit zip code,
ather than CBG, level, we measure car ownership rates by the
ip code of the location.
Finally, we augment these data with responses from a pri-
ary consumer survey that we mailed to a subset of the chain’s
ustomers (i.e., those with loyalty cards and who made at least
2 shopping trips to stores = 1430). On the basis of the cus-
omers’ net profit margins at the individual level, we identify
hree sample groups: (1) negative values (i.e., ECP customers);
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n our conceptual framework, these customers should be occa-
ional, regular and rare basket splitters. The respondents are the
rimary grocery shoppers in their respective households. We
eceived 529 surveys, for an overall response rate of 37%. The
istribution of the 529 customers across the three profit groups
s close to equitable, with 168 negative values; 178 low, positive
alues; and 183 high, positive values.
For each customer, we gather information about household
ize, income level, names and addresses of the primary and main
econdary stores, approximate shares of wallet at each store, and
he main reason for shopping at the secondary store. The address
nformation enables us to geo-code and compute the inter-store
istance. As Putrevu and Ratchford (1997) point out, it is very
ifficult to develop a multi-item scale for the unit opportunity
ost measure that exhibits high scale reliability; we follow them,
auri, Sudhir, and Talukdar (2008), and Marmorstein, Grewal,
nd Fiske (1992) and employ a single-item measure that asks
espondents to indicate the hourly wage rate at which they would
e willing to undertake an extra hour of work.
We use self-reported consumer survey information to con-
truct the various attitudinal and behavioral measures. All items
n our constructs are based on previous studies in consumer
rice search literature. Appendix C presents a complete list of
he items, their corresponding reliability coefficients, and their
ources.
Empirical analyses results
hat characterizes extreme cherry pickers?
The cost–benefit conceptual framework suggests that a key
eterminant of ECP behavior is the opportunity cost of a cross-
tore shopping trip. Specifically, at the aggregate store level,
he framework hypothesizes an inverse U-shaped relationship
etween the proportions of ECP customers across stores and the
ean opportunity costs of cross-store shopping; at the individual
ustomer level, it hypothesizes an inverse U-shaped relationship
etween customers’ opportunity cost of cross-store shopping
nd their likelihood of exhibiting ECP behavior. We test for this
elationship at both the store and customer levels.
Aggregate store-level analysis. For the aggregate store-level
nalysis, we run a regression analysis of the proportions of ECP
ustomers of each store in our data set vs. the mean opportunity
osts of cross-store shopping. First, we treat mean opportunity
ost as a continuous measure and include both linear and
uadratic terms as explanatory variables. Second, we treat the
ean opportunity cost as a discrete measure and use it as an
xplanatory variable with five mutually exclusive and exhaustive
evels (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). To obtain a relative
easure of the mean opportunity cost of cross-store shopping
or customers, we use Eq. (4) and measure distance d in terms of
he distance between the store and its nearest competing grocery
tore and the unit opportunity cost of time w according to the
mputed hourly wage rate from the mean per capita income
or the population in the store’s trading region. We assume the
dditional trip time A and travel speed s are the same for all
ustomers, equal to 15 min and 35 miles/h, respectively. These
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Table 3
Regression results for the proportion of extreme cherry picking shoppers across stores.
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
Market characteristics
Mean opportunity cost of cross-store shopping trip to
the nearest competing store ($)
0.019 E−02 *** 0.007 E−02
Square of the mean opportunity cost of cross-store
shopping trip
−0.149 E−04 *** 0.032 E−04
Mean opportunity cost of cross-store shopping trip in discrete ranges
Less than $3 −0.363 E−02*** 0.132 E−02
$3–less than $6 −0.114 E−02** 0.056 E−02
$6–less than $9 (Base)
$9–less than $12 −0.143 E−02** 0.069 E−02
More than $12 −0.304 E−02*** 0.097 E−02
Number of competing stores in the trading area −0.009 E−01*** 0.003 E−01 −0.009 E−01*** 0.003 E−01
Mean per capita annual income for population in the
trading area ($)
0.177 E−09 0.431 E−08 0.174 E−09 0.429 E−08
Mean household size for population in the trading area 0.041*** 0.009 0.040*** 0.009
Proportion of 60 years and above among population in
the trading area
0.123*** 0.041 0.122*** 0.039
Proportion of married among adult population in the
trading area
0.042* 0.023 0.043* 0.023
Home ownership rate among population in the trading
area
−0.020 0.013 −0.020 0.014
Retailer characteristics
Mean price promotion depth at the store (%) 0.060 E−03** 0.031 E−03 0.063 E−03** 0.032 E−03
Mean proportion of items on weekly loss leader
promotions at the store
0.011 *** 0.003 0.012 *** 0.003
Floor area of the store (Sq. Ft.) 0.193 E−08*** 0.483 E−09 0.193 E−08*** 0.483 E−09
Intercept −0.122*** 0.028 −0.121*** 0.029
N 152 152









































* p < .1.
** p < .05.
** p < .01.
pecific values do not affect our analysis findings; they simply
hift the relative scale used to measure customers’ opportunity
osts.
The opportunity cost of cross-store shopping reflects both
ustomer (unit opportunity cost of time, w) and market
ompetition (inter-store distance, d) characteristics. Although
pportunity cost is our focal explanatory variable, we test the
ffects of several market, store, and customer characteristics on
onsumer deal-seeking behavior (Blattberg et al. 1978; Fox and
och 2005; Mace and Neslin 2004). Because of a high degree of
orrelation (>.7) with income, we exclude three customer vari-
bles – education level, car ownership rate, and housing value –
rom our final analysis.
The results of the aggregate store-level regression analysis
ppear in Table 3. Models 1 and 2 use opportunity cost as
continuous and discrete measure, respectively. The results
rom Model 1 show a statistically significant positive coefficient
p < .01) for the mean opportunity cost of cross-store shopping
nd a negative coefficient (p < .01) for the mean opportunity
ost squared term. In Model 2, we also find significant coef-
cients of mean opportunity cost, such that the proportion of
CP customers decreases with either lower or higher opportu-




f an inverse U-shaped relationship between the proportion of
CP customers across stores and the mean opportunity costs of
ross-store shopping for those customers.
Most of the other explanatory variables are statistically sig-
ificant (p < .1 and below), with signs consistent with previous
ndings or a priori expectations (Table 2). The proportion of ECP
ehavior increases with greater household sizes, higher propor-
ions of seniors (60 years and older), and higher proportions
f married people in the focal store’s customer base. However,
ncome and house ownership levels have no significant (p > .1)
ffects; the effect of income appears partially accounted for by
he opportunity cost of cross-store shopping. More competing
tores in the trading area have a significant (p < .01) negative
ffect on the proportion of customers at a focal store who exhibit
CP behaviors, which may suggest a split effect. In terms of
tore characteristics, the proportion of customers who exhibit
CP behaviors increases with the weekly mean depth of price
romotions at the focal store, as well as the weekly mean breadth
f items on loss leader promotion. We also find a strong (p < .01)
ositive relationship between a store’s size and its proportion of
CP customers.
Disaggregate customer-level analysis. We complement our
nsights from the store-level aggregate analysis with customer-
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Table 4
Nature of relationship between customer profitability and selected consumer characteristics: regression results.
Independent variables: consumer characteristics Dependent variable: customer profit margina
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5
Intercept 0.26 (0.01)*** 0.46 (0.02)*** 0.23 (0.04)*** 0.57 (0.12)*** 0.14 (0.01)***
Opportunity cost of cross-store search −0.12 (0.00)***
Square of opportunity cost of cross-store search 0.01 (0.00)***
Cross-store search propensity −0.25 (0.01)***
Square of cross-store search propensity 0.03 (0.00)***
Trip frequency at the primary store −0.22 (0.07)***
Square of trip frequency at the primary store 0.07 (0.02)***
Wallet share at the primary store −0.02 (0.00)***
Square of wallet share at the primary store 0.1E−3 (0.00)***
Wallet share at the secondary store −0.6E−2 (0.00)***
Square of wallet share at the secondary store 0.1E−3 (0.00)***















dj. R 0.76 0
a Standard errors are shown in parentheses after the respective coefficient esti
** p < .01.
evel analyses to test and develop a detailed comparative
onsumer profile of ECP customers (Table 1). Specifically, we
ombine market transaction and consumer survey data from 529
ustomers who represent the three distinct segments in terms






mpirical findings: comparative profiles of extreme cherry pickers by customer chara











Self-reported unit opportunity cost of time ($/h) 14.68 7.82
Total opportunity cost of cross-store trip ($) 4.71 2.51
Cross-store search propensitya 3.08 4.2
Within-store inter-temporal search propensitya 4.01 4.06
Market mavenisma 3.04 3.91
Perceived price search skilla 3.96 4.01
Agreement with price savings as the primary
reason for shopping at the secondary storea
4.61 4.53
Household size 3.32 3.45
Household annual income (Th. $) 52.3 41.2
% of households whose primary grocery shopper
is 60 years and above in age
20.24 21.81
evealed characteristics
Distance from home to the primary store (miles) 3.09 3.05
Distance between the primary and secondary
stores (miles)
2.95 2.75
Weekly trip frequency at the primary store 1.03 1.45
Weekly trip frequency at the secondary store 0.39 1.02
Focal store is primary store (%) 0.00 56.91
Wallet share at the primary store (%) 85.87 57.79
Wallet share at the secondary store (%) 13.29 41.04
Wallet share at the focal store (%) 13.29 51.43
Avg. weekly grocery spending at all stores ($) 84.84 90.12
Ratio of avg. profit contribution per week to the
focal store (Base: Segment #2)
−0.10 1.00
a These items are measured on a five point scale anchored by “strongly agree” (5) a0.02 0.07 0.06
.
hain. We use Eq. (4) to obtain a relative measure of the oppor-
unity cost of cross-store shopping for each customer, such that
is the distance between the primary and secondary stores, the
nit opportunity cost of time w is the self-reported value from
he survey, and the additional trip time A and travel speed s
cteristics.











1 vs. Segment # 2
Segment # 1 vs.
Segment # 3
Segment # 2 vs.
Segment # 3
22.96 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01
8.10 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01
1.58 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01
1.54 p > .1 p < .01 p < .01
1.53 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01
1.93 p > .1 p < .01 p < .01
1.36 p > .1 p < .01 p < .01
2.85 p > .1 p < .01 p < .01
63.7 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01
17.92 p > .1 p > .1 p > .1
3.64 p > .1 p < .01 p < .01
3.83 p > .1 p < .01 p < .01
0.96 p < .01 p < .05 p < .01
0.38 p < .01 p > .1 p < .01
100.00 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01
89.56 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01
10.35 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01
89.56 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01
80.76 p > .1 p > .1 p < .05
4.60 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01
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gain equal 15 min and 35 miles/h, respectively. We perform the
ustomer-level analyses in two ways.
First, we run regression analyses between customer profit
argin and several consumer characteristics, one at a time, to
est for the nonlinear relationships conceptualized in Table 1 and
rovide the results in Table 4 for five consumer characteristics.
o test for possible nonlinear relationships, we use both a linear
erm and a quadratic term for each consumer characteristic. The
igh statistical significance (p < .01) of both linear and quadratic
erms indicates a strong, nonlinear relationship between cus-
omer profitability and the analyzed consumer characteristics.
Second, we compute the sample mean or proportion values of
he various consumer characteristics across the three customer
egments and test for their statistical differences. Table 5 con-
ains the findings, which not only confirm the core implications
rom our cost–benefit conceptual framework (Table 1) but also
hed light into who is likely to engage in ECP behavior. For
xample, a household’s combined share of total grocery spend-
ng at its two most frequently visited stores varies from 90% to
00% across respondents, with an average of 98%. This find-
ng is consistent with several past studies (e.g., Gauri, Sudhir,
nd Talukdar 2008; Urbany, Dickson, and Kalapurakal 1996;
rbany, Dickson, and Sawyer 2000) and our conceptual premise
hat a household’s grocery store spending typically concentrates
n one or two stores. The main secondary store for each house-
old tends to be the competitor nearest the primary store, which
ndicates that cross-store shopping distance drives the choice of
he major secondary store. Interestingly, although our survey did
ot preclude a respondent’s two most frequently visited grocery
tores from belonging to the same retail chain, they always came
rom different chains obviously reflecting the reality of spatial
istributions of competitive store locations in the market ana-
yzed. At the same time, for 96% of our sample respondents,
heir two most frequently visited grocery stores in fact belong
o the two regional supermarket chains, which is not surprising
iven that these two chains represent a de facto duopoly gro-
ery market structure (by accounting for more than 80% market
hares) for the regional market analyzed.
The mean relative opportunity cost for seekers (i.e., ECP
ustomers) is between those of customers who represent the
oyalists (i.e., high positive profit margin customers) and oppor-
unists (low positive profit margin customers). We thus again find
trong empirical support for the hypothesized inverse U-shaped
elationship between customers’ relative opportunity cost of
ross-store search and their likelihood of exhibiting ECP behav-
or. Customers’ ECP behavior also appears only in their visits to
heir secondary stores, where they shop occasionally (average
.5 weeks) to buy a small share (13% on average) of grocery
eeds.
Of equal interest are insights from contrasts of customers’
tated price search involvement, skill, search motivation, and
atterns across the three segments. Regarding market mavenism
nd perceived price search skills, the seekers and opportunist
xhibit similar levels, which are significantly (p < .01) higher
han those of the loyalists. In terms of their primary reason
or shopping at the secondary stores, both the seekers and
pportunists cite price savings significantly (p < .01) more than
t
i
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oyalists. However, these groups differ in their stated price search
atterns. They engage in inter-temporal and cross-store price
earch behaviors more (p < .01) than do loyalists, but the level
f cross-store search behavior among seekers is significantly
ower (3.08 vs. 4.2, p < .01) than that of the opportunists.
These findings indicate that both the seekers and loyalists
emain basically loyal to their primary stores but make occa-
ional trips to secondary stores. However, seekers customers
rganize their occasional trips to secondary stores to buy deeply
iscounted items. They also actively engage in inter-temporal
rice search strategies for their purchases at primary stores.
n contrast, the opportunists regularly shop and split their pur-
hases between primary and secondary stores, and neither store
ears the full brunt of their price search strategy or serves as an
xclusive source of deep discount bargain hunts. As our concep-
ual framework and empirical results show, a key determinant
f different shopping behaviors across customer groups is the
nderlying difference in the opportunity costs of cross-store
earch.
ow prevalent is extreme cherry picking behavior?
We use both short-term (weekly) and long-term (annual)
ssessments to determine the prevalence of ECP behavior across
ifferent stores in different competitive market contexts. For the
eekly analysis, we randomly select 4 weeks of transaction data
er store for 25 stores, for a total of 100 store-week time peri-
ds. We compute the size of the ECP segment for each selected
tore-week as the proportion of a store’s customers who gen-
rated net negative profit contributions. The proportion of the
xtreme cherry pickers has a mean value of .021 with a standard
eviation of .006 (see Fig. 3, panel a).
For each of the 152 stores, we use the scanner database to
dentify the size of its regular customer base by counting cus-
omers who shopped at the store at least 12 different times during
002. We then compute the size of the seeker (or ECP) seg-
ent as the proportion of a store’s regular customer base that
enerated net negative profit contributions to the store during
002. Across 152 stores, this annual measure shows that the
ean proportion of extreme cherry pickers is .015 with a stan-
ard deviation of .011 (ranging from .04% to 5.96% in various
ocations; see Fig. 3, panel b).
The weekly measure indicates a relatively larger seeker (or
CP) segment, because it includes both occasional and system-
tic ECP behaviors. However, on an absolute level, both the
eekly and annual measures suggest a small seeker (or ECP)
egment (Gauri, Sudhir, and Talukdar (2008) also find a small
CP segment). This finding contrasts with the conventional wis-
om (McWilliams 2004). Moreover, our findings indicate that
espite the small size, the relative magnitude of the ECP segment
aries across different stores and competitive market contexts.
ow do extreme cherry pickers affect store profits?A loss leader pricing strategy attempts to attract cus-
omers to the store and induce them to buy non–loss leader
tems in addition to the loss leader items. However, sev-




























Fig. 3. Distribution of extreme cherry pickers: (a
ral interesting questions remain regarding this rationale: (1)
hat proportion of customers buy non–loss leader items in
ddition to the promoted loss leader items? (2) How much
f the profit generated by these customers is attributable
o the loss leader pricing strategy? (3) Is the incremental
rofit great enough to cover the unavoidable pure loss of the
egative profit contribution generated by the ECP customer
who buy only the loss leader items?
Heuristic approach to profitability. Using our store-specific
ransaction and profit contribution data, we perform a customer-
evel analysis. We use customer transaction data for 100 store-
eek combinations (4 randomly selected weeks, 25 randomlyelected stores). For each case, we use transactional and profit
ata to analyze all customers who visit the store that week, or
pproximately 1.8 million customer trips, and summarize the





ed on weekly data and (b) based on annual data.
For any weekly loss leader pricing cycle, approximately 68%
f customers (maximum 29.53% share buy 10–20% loss leader
tems, 25.28% buy 20–30%) buy both non- and loss leader items.
nly 2.1% of customers are ECP customers who buy only loss
eader items, and they buy fewer items on average (3.06) than
hose who buy either no loss leader items (5.51) or a mix of items
15.98). The typical unavoidable pure loss generated by the cus-
omers who buy only loss leader items is approximately .34%
f net store profit, whereas the profit contribution from desir-
ble customers averages 85.33% (Table 6). However, we cannot
ttribute this profit contribution to loss leader pricing entirely,
ecause doing so would assume that these customers would not
ave shopped without the loss leader pricing promotion. Instead,
e estimate the incremental profit contribution attributable
o the loss leader pricing strategy, based on the adjustment
actor aijt.
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Table 6
Profit impact of loss leader (LL) pricing strategy: insights from heuristic approach (N = 100 store-weeks).
Subset of shoppers Proportion of









(as % of store
profit)a
Loss from LL




(as % of store
profit)a
Adjusted net profit
impact due to LL




x = 0 29.91 (3.53) 5.51 (0.48) 15.03 (2.91) 0 (0.0) 15.0 (2.91) 0 (0.0)
Purchased both non-LL
and LL items
0 < x ≤ 0.2 29.53 (3.75) 25.5 (2.96) 58.57 (4.24) −3.32 (0.24) 55.16 (4.14) 18.71 (1.27)
0.2 < x ≤ 0.4 25.28 (1.66) 19.91 (2.61) 31.28 (3.36) −5.05 (0.75) 26.19 (2.72)
0.4 < x ≤ 0.6 9.15 (0.98) 13.11 (2.06) 5.68 (1.02) −2.10 (0.50) 3.59 (0.57)



















































empirical evidence that the loss leader pricing strategy generates
incremental profit contributions to retailers, over and above the
unavoidable pure loss produced by the ECP customer segment.
Table 7
Calibration results for the shopping trip incidence hazard model.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Customer characteristics
Last trip basket size ($) −0.0004 0.0002
Primary shopper dummy 0.51** 0.04
Time since last trip (weeks) −0.14*** 0.01
Primary shopper dummy × time
since last trip
−0.01 0.02
Proportion of loss leader items
bought in last trip
−0.08 0.05
Proportion of private label items
bought in last trip
0.05 0.05
Median age 0.005*** 0.001
Median income ($) 8.47E−07 7.50E−07
Distance to the focal store (miles) −0.09*** 0.03




Breadth of Loss leader
promo × 100
0.09*** 0.01
Depth of loss leader promo × 100 0.15*** 0.003
Store price index ($) −0.01*** 0.004
Intercept −9.65*** 0.24
Number of subjects 705
No. of parameters 130.8 < x < 1 1.13 (0.12) 11.21 (1.33)
urchased only LL items x = 1 2.10 (0.51) 3.06 (0.50)
a Mean value across the 100 store-week cases with the standard deviation sho
The adjusted profit contributions using the heuristic approach
till indicate that the typical incremental profit contribution
18.71%) from customers who buy both types of items is signif-
cantly greater than the typical unavoidable pure loss generated
y ECP customers (.34%). These results dissect the underlying
ost–benefit trade-off dynamics of loss leader pricing strategy
sing a relatively easy computational approach that employs
ata readily available to most retailers. The findings in Table 4
hus provide a template for a useful and easy to implement gauge
hat retail managers can use to monitor and evaluate the effects
f their strategic pricing decisions (Marketing Science Institute
006).
Statistical approach to profitability. A similar profit impact
nalysis using the alternative statistical approach based on the
HM calibrates shopping trip incidence with transaction data for
00 randomly selected customers. On the basis of prior studies
nd conceptual expectations about the factors likely to influ-
nce a customer’s shopping trip incidence, we choose several
ustomer- and store-specific covariates for the hazard model
Gonul and Srinivasan 1993; Gupta 1991; Jain and Vilcassim
991). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to
nvestigate explicitly the effect of loss leader pricing promotions
n individual customers’ shopping trip incidence.
The PHM calibration results in Table 7 show that the cus-
omer hazard function for shopping trip incidence depends on
he various covariates, mostly consistent with prior studies and
xpectations. For example, the distance of the customer’s home
rom the focal store has a significant and negative effect, whereas
ts distance to the nearest competing store has a significant and
ositive effect. The hazard function of shopping trip incidence
lso is positively affected for the primary shopper and negatively
ffected by the focal store price index. The key results from our
odel calibration relate to the effects of the depth and breadth
f loss leader pricing at the store level; both have strong (p < .01)
ositive effects on customers’ hazard function for shopping trip
ncidence.
We use the calibrated PHM to carry out a profit impact anal-
sis with 40 separate, randomly selected store-week cases. For
ach case, we also select 300 random customers who shopped
uring that week at the store. Similar to our heuristic approach,
or each of the 40 customer sample groups (n = 300), we com-




0.22 (0.07) −0.21 (0.08) 0.009 (0.05)
0 (0.0) −0.34 (0.22) −0.34 (0.22) −0.34 (0.22)
parentheses.
on- and loss leader items and the pure loss generated by those
ho purchased only loss leader items. Finally, we adjust the
rofit contributions from the former customers using the cali-
rated PHM to estimate the adjustment factor aijt. Even after the
djustment, we again find that the typical incremental profit con-
ribution (mean = 4.12%, std. dev. = .48%) from customers who
uy both items is significantly more than the typical unavoidable
ure loss generated by customers who buy only loss leader items
mean = .16%, std. dev. = .23%). That is, each of our alternative
pproaches for computing the adjustment factor provides strongog likelihood 12,244.49
chwarz information criterion (SIC) −24,334.72
** p < .05.
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Conclusion
ummary and implications
Both business managers and academic researchers have noted
onsumers’ price search and cherry picking behavior in retail
arkets, but an especially interesting phenomenon is the exis-
ence of the so-called extreme cherry pickers that generate
egative profit contributions for retailers. Retailers strongly
esire an in-depth understanding of such behavior; yet to the
est of our knowledge, little systematic research attempts to
nvestigate the prevalence, determinants, or profit impacts of
CP behavior. We focus exclusively on such ECP behavior in
he context of frequently purchased goods. Our key findings are
s follows.
Mean size of ECP segment is small and an inverse U-shaped
elationship between customers’ relative opportunity cost and
heir likelihood of exhibiting ECP behavior. On the basis of data
rom 152 grocery supermarket stores, we find that the mean size
f the ECP customer segment for any store is quite small (1.5%),
hough the relative value varies substantially across stores in
ifferent competitive contexts. Although our study suggest a
mall size of ECP segment, we must point that domain of our
tudy is grocery shopping and ECP is likely to be higher for
ther domains such as electronics (e.g. McWilliams (2004) sug-
ests that proportion of such customers to be as high as 20%
or the electronics retailer Best Buy). Thus retailers like Wal-
art Supercenter, Target etc., which have grocery, electronics
nd other categories of merchandise, are likely to find higher
roportion of cherry picking customers and as a consequence
rofitability ramifications for a retailer could be much more
verse than what we find.
Using merged market transaction and consumer survey data
t the consumer level, we find that the relative opportunity cost of
ross-store price search represents the key determinant of ECP
ehavior. As with our aggregate store-level analysis, we find
trong empirical support for an inverse U-shaped relationship
etween customers’ relative opportunity cost and their likeli-
ood of exhibiting ECP behavior. Customers who systematically
enerate negative profit contributions are not the ones with the
owest opportunity cost of cross-store price search.
At the individual level our results also provides a number of
nsights into extreme cherry picking behavior. If we consider the
omparison of the ECP segment to the loyalist segment (Table 5),
e can see a number of key differences between the two seg-
ents. ECP consumers are ones that demonstrate a greater
ross-store and within-store inter-temporal search propensity,
re market mavens, have higher price search skills and shop at
he secondary store for price savings.
Consumers’ ECP behavior pertains to their secondary stores
lone. In particular, ECP customers shop for most of their house-
old grocery items at a primary store, where they engage in
ithin-store, inter-temporal price search. Their secondary storeserve only as destinations for occasional cross-store trips to take
dvantage of deep price discounts. These ECP customers and
ustomers who generate low but positive profit contributions for
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s a key difference. Secondary stores bear most of the adverse
ffects of price search for the ECP customers, whereas the effects
et divided between primary and secondary stores for low profit
ustomers. Our conceptual framework further shows that the
ain driver of this key behavioral difference is the difference in
he opportunity costs of cross-store search. The ECP customers
ause the worst profit impact, but they are not the customers with
he lowest opportunity cost.
Loss leader pricing strategy adds to retailers’ bottom lines.
ith regards to the effectiveness of the loss leader pricing strat-
gy, we show that the majority (68%) of a grocery store’s
ustomers buy both non- and loss leader items while shop-
ing. Only a very small percentage (2%) buy loss leader items
lone and thus generate an unavoidable pure loss for retailers.
his unavoidable pure loss is significantly less than the typical
ncremental profit contribution gained from incremental sales
enerated by customers who buy non–loss leader items along
ith loss leader items. Thus, our findings offer strong evidence
hat the loss leader pricing strategy still adds to retailers’ bottom
ines, even in presence of an ECP customer segment that buys
oss leader items almost exclusively.
Since our results suggest that the mean size of Extreme
herry Pickers’ can be small and that loss leader pricing adds to
he retailer bottom line, retailers may not want to spend too much
f their resources avoiding attracting this segment. Instead, they
ay want to develop creative promotions to help convert these
onsumers from viewing the given store as their secondary store
o their primary store. These promotions could include targeted
reater discounts as the size of the basket or the quantity of
djacent items increase.
imitations and future research directions
Our study provides a good foundation and backdrop for sev-
ral interesting research extensions. First, we perform a detailed
ost–benefit analysis of the profit impact of a loss leader pricing
trategy but do not investigate it from a normative perspec-
ive. Further research might explore the impact of loss leader
ricing strategies relative to non–loss leader pricing strategies.
o their impacts differ for various key performance measures?
re certain product categories more effective in boosting store
erformance when they appear in a loss leader promotion?
Second, we use weekly AAC to compute the profit margins
nd identify loss leader items; an ideal theoretical cost mea-
ure would use weekly replacement costs. However, computing
eplacement costs requires detailed information about inven-
ory turnover, wholesale prices, and trade deals for thousands of
tems, which makes this idea a challenging research extension.
Third, for the individual household level analysis in our study,
e restrict our analysis to the two most frequently visited stores
the primary and the main secondary store – for each household.
s discussed earlier, this restriction was not critical in our case
ecause of the de facto duopoly competitive structure for the
egional grocery market in our study. As a result, a household’s
rocery store choice set size was essentially two with an almost
xclusive concentration (90–100%) of its grocery spending at














































































The choice of the functional form for the covariate function
depends on the requirement that the hazard function always be
nonnegative. We use the following functional form to representD. Talukdar et al. / Journal o
ontexts, it will be interesting to expand the analysis to encom-
ass multiple secondary stores per household. We recognize that
etting the relevant data will again represent a great challenge
s it will require the difficult to get cost data from multiple retail
hains. Still, the challenge may be worthwhile given the deeper
nsights such data is likely to provide about consumers’ ECP
ehavior. In a similar fashion to work on deals and price com-
arison advertising (e.g., Grewal, Monroe, and Krishnan 1998;
ichtenstein, Netemeyer, and Burton 1990), it would be useful to
ndertake research to understand the underlying processes and
nterrelationships between these psychological variables (e.g.,
ross-store search propensity, within-store inter-temporal search
ropensity, market mavenism, etc.) and cherry picking behavior.
t would be useful to also study how the role of opportunity cost
r time on cherry picking behavior is moderated by a number
f these individual characteristics. Lab experiments are likely to
rovided important insights regarding these relationships.
Fourth, we consider cross-sectional variation in price search
fficacy among consumers; additional research could analyze
he within-consumer temporal evolution and investigate how
onsumer, product, and market characteristics drive such evolu-
ion.
Fifth, our conceptual framework and empirical findings per-
ain to the context of FPG markets. Research should address
ther product markets, such as durables, to study the prevalence,
eterminants, and profit impacts of consumers’ ECP behavior.
n equally interesting and related avenue of additional research
ould be to understand the role of the Internet and appropri-
te shopping bots (e.g., Lindsey-Mullikin and Grewal 2006) on
rice search behavior and extreme cherry picking. As a conse-
uence of these shopping bots reducing the cost of search, it
s likely that the size of the extreme cherry picking behavior is
ikely to much higher for categories (e.g., electronics) that are
overed by such search bots.
Finally, given the macroeconomic changes over the past few
ears (Grewal, Levy, and Kumar 2009), it is important for future
esearch to utilize recent data from other chains to validate our
ndings. One would speculate that due to the recent economic
risis, the incidence of cherry picking has likely gone up.
Appendix A.
The profit contribution pijt of any customer i at store j on
eek t is described as follows:
ijt = lijt + gijt (A1)
here lijt is the negative profit contribution (or loss) generated
rom the purchase of loss leader item(s), gijt is the positive profit
ontribution (gain) generated from the purchase of non–loss
eader item(s).
Now let S(1), S(2) and S(3) represents three subsets of cus-
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The profit contribution P (1)jt from the first subset (S
(1)) of





gijt = Gjt, ∀i ∈ S(1)jt (A2a)
here Gjt represents the total gain from purchases of non–loss
eader items.5
The profit contribution P (2)jt from the second subset (S
(2)) of





lijt = Ljt, ∀i ∈ S(2)jt (A2b)
here Ljt represents the total loss from the purchases of loss
eader items.6 Using the composition of their shopping bas-
ets, we assume that shopping trips by customers in subset S(2)jt
espond completely to loss leader pricing strategy at store j on
eek t. Therefore, their negative profit contribution P (2)jt repre-
ents the pure loss imposed by ECP customers. However, from
etailers’ perspective, this unavoidable cost may be less than the
enefit this pricing strategy generates from the third subset of
ustomers.
The third subset (S(3)) consists of customers whose shopping
askets include both loss leader and non-leader items. Their








gijt = Ljt + Gjt, ∀i ∈ S(3)jt . (A2c)
Appendix B.
Based on the proportional hazard model (PHM; Cox 1972;
onul and Srinivasan 1993; Gupta 1991; Jain and Vilcassim
991), we specify a customer’s probability (or hazard function)
f undertaking a shopping trip at a given store, conditional on
he elapsed time (t) since the customer’s previous shopping trip
o the store, as follows:
i(t, Xt) = hi(t) ∗ φi(Xt), (A3)
here hi(t, Xt) is consumer i’s hazard function at time t, Xt is a
ow-vector of covariates facing customer i at time t, hi(t) is cus-
omer i’s baseline hazard at time t, and ϕi(Xt) indicates customer
’s covariate function at time t. In this multiplicative model, the
aseline hazard represents the probability distribution that char-
cterizes the customer’s interpurchase trip times; the covariate
unction shifts this baseline hazard up or down depending on the
alues of the covariates.5 The first subset represents those whose shopping baskets do not include any
oss leader items and who therefore provide no negative profit contribution (i.e.,
ijt = 0).
6 The second subset of customers buys only loss leader items and thus offers
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he covariate function (Seetharaman and Chintagunta 2003):
i(Xt) = eXt∗βi , (A4)
here βi represents a column-vector of parameters correspond-
ng to the covariates contained in Xt (e.g., consumer-level
ariables such as last trip basket size, dummy variable for pri-
ary vs. secondary shopper, time elapsed since last trip, depth
nd breadth of loss leader pricing encountered). This function
ields the standard PHM:
i(t, Xt) = hi(t) ∗ eXt∗βi , (A5)
nd the hazard function can be written as:
i(t, Xt) = f (t, Xt)
1 − F (t, Xt) = hi(t) ∗ e
Xt∗βi , (A6)
here f(t, Xt) represents the probability density function (pdf)
hat corresponds to customer i’s hazard function at time t, and
(t, Xt) is the corresponding cumulative density function (cdf).
n our study context, f(t, Xt) indicates the customer’s probability
f conducting a shopping trip to the given store at time t, and
− F(t, Xt) equals the probability that the customer has not made
he trip before time t since the last trip. Rearranging Eq. (A6)
ields the following estimable version of the continuous-time
HM (Seetharaman and Chintagunta 2003):








We use the parameter estimates from the PHM to obtain
mpirical estimates of the probability Prijt from Eq. (4) for cus-
omer i, based on the relevant covariate X values with respect to
shopping trip to store j in week t.
The baseline hazard function hi (t) in the PHM can be
at, monotonically increasing, or monotonically decreasing;
n turn, it can take various functional forms, such as expo-
ential, Weibull, Gompertz, log-logistic, log normal, and so
orth. Because of its flexibility, the Weibull distribution is the
ost popular baseline hazard specification; we use it to spec-
fy the baseline hazard function for our model. We also tried
lternative specifications, but the model fit is best with the
eibull distribution specification. Hence, the hazard function
s:
(t, Xt) = h(t) ∗ eXt∗β = p ∗ tp−1 ∗ eβ0 ∗ eXt∗β, (A8)
here p is an ancillary shape parameter estimated from the data,
nd the scale parameter is parameterized as exp(β0). We suppress
he subscript i for notational ease.Appendix C.
Multi-item scale items
All items were responses from mail surveys and were eval-
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. Inter-temporal price search propensity: Propensity to compare prices
across multiple time periods in a particular store. (5 items; Cronbach’s
alpha = .84)
• I usually plan the timing of my shopping trip to a particular grocery
store in such a way so as to get the best price deals offered at that
store.a
• There are times when I delay my shopping trip to wait for a better price
deal.a
• Although planned before making a shopping trip, I often do not buy
some items if I think they will be on better deal shortly.a
• I keep track of price specials offered for the grocery products at the
stores I regularly buy from.a
• To get the best price deals for my groceries I often buy the items I need
over 2 or 3 trips.a
. Spatial price search propensity: Propensity to compare prices across
multiple stores in a particular week. (5 items; Cronbach’s alpha = .86)
• I often compare the prices of two or more grocery stores.b
• I decide each week where to shop for my groceries based upon store
ads/fliers.b
• I regularly shop the price specials at one store and then the price
specials at another store.b
• Before going grocery shopping I check the newspaper for
advertisements by various supermarkets.c
• To get the best price deals for my groceries I often shop at 2 or 3
different stores.c
. Market mavenism: “Individuals who have information about many kinds
of products, places to shop, and other facets of markets, and initiate
discussions with consumers and respond to requests from consumers for
market information” (Feick and Price 1987, p. 85).
(4 items; Cronbach’s alpha = .87)
• I like it when people ask me for information about products, places to
shop, or sales.b,d
• I like it when someone asks me where to get the best buy on several
types of • products.b,d
• I know a lot of different products, stores, and sales and I like sharing
this information.b,d
• I think of myself as a good source of information for other people
when it comes to new products or sales.b,d
. Perceived search skills: Proficient in shopping for groceries. (8 items;
Cronbach’s alpha = .73)
• I know what products I am going to buy before going to the
supermarket.c
• I am a well organized grocery shopper.c
• Before going to the supermarket, I plan my purchases based on the
specials available that week.c
• I can easily tell if a sale/special price is a good deal.b
• It is very difficult to compare the prices of grocery stores (reverse
coded).b
• It is very difficult to compare the quality of meat and produce between
grocery stores (reverse coded).2
• I prepare a shopping list before going grocery shopping.c
• I pre-sort my coupons before going grocery shopping.c
a Gauri, Sudhir, and Talukdar (2008).
b Urbany, Dickson, and Kalapurakal (1996).
c Putrevu and Ratchford (1997).
d Feick and Price (1987).
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